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ACCUSED AND UNCONVICTED: FLEEING FROM WEALTHBASED PRETRIAL DETENTION
Cynthia E. Jones*
I, Miranda Lynn ODonnell, am a 22-year-old woman. I was
arrested yesterday, May 18, 2016 . . . for a misdemeanor
offense [driving with an invalid license]. I was told by the
Sheriff’s deputies that my money bail is $2500. I know that
because I cannot afford to pay that amount, I have to stay in
jail. I saw a TV judge this morning . . . . He said my bail will
stay at $2500. . . . I was never asked if I could afford my bail.
A sheriff’s deputy told me not to say anything during my
hearing. It took about 60 seconds. I have a 4-year-old
daughter. I receive [public] assistance . . . to support her. I
can’t afford rent so I stay with a friend. I just started working
at a restaurant a few weeks ago. I live paycheck to paycheck.
I’m worried about whether my job will still be there when I get
out.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Over thirty years ago the United States Supreme Court recognized
that “liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial
is the carefully limited exception.”2 Today, the “norm” is pretrial
detention for nearly 450,000 people across the country, many of
whom are destitute but eligible for immediate release if they pay the
money bail imposed by the court.3 Throughout the history of

* Professor of Law at the American University Washington College of Law.
1 First Amended Class Action Complaint at 44–45, ODonnell v. Harris Cty., No. 16-CV-1414
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2016), https://cdn.buttercms.com/R5BRcSFSvWo57Kr2Net1.
2 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
3 See ACLU CAMPAIGN FOR SMART JUSTICE, SELLING OFF OUR FREEDOM 18 (2017)
[hereinafter SELLING OFF OUR FREEDOM]; CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, HARVARD LAW
SCH., MOVING BEYOND MONEY: A PRIMER ON BAIL REFORM 6 (2016) [hereinafter MOVING
BEYOND MONEY] (“Nationwide, 34% of defendants are kept in jail pretrial solely because they
are unable to pay a cash bond, and most of these are among the poorest third of Americans.”).
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America,4 money bail has been, and continues to be, the most
significant barrier to pretrial freedom for those who are arrested but
presumed innocent of criminal conduct.5 For many arrestees, money
bail works exactly as intended: it provides an expedient mechanism
for pretrial release upon posting a sum of money to seal the
defendant’s promise to return to court for future hearings.6 However,
conditioning pretrial release on the payment of a sum of money
results in de facto pretrial detention for indigent defendants because
they will remain in jail until their case is resolved.7 In some
jurisdictions, the amount of money bail courts demanded for minor
offenses can be as high as $5,000,8 effectively placing pretrial freedom
far beyond the meager resources of the indigent. At the other end of
the spectrum, many people languish in jail for weeks or months even
when bail is set as low as a few hundred dollars or less.9
It is significant that money bail is imposed routinely in cases
involving minor traffic infractions or petty regulatory offenses for
which the maximum penalty upon conviction is a fine of a few
hundred dollars, but no period of incarceration.10 Likewise, pretrial
4 See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 30 (Henry Reeve trans., 1835)
(“[Bail] is hostile to the poor and favourable only to the rich. The poor man has not always a
security to pledge. . . .”).
5 See TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE, NAT’L INST. OF CORRECTIONS, FUNDAMENTALS OF BAIL: A
RESOURCE GUIDE FOR PRETRIAL PRACTITIONERS AND A FRAMEWORK FOR AMERICAN PRETRIAL
REFORM 2 (2014).
6 See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, FINES, FEES, AND BAIL: PAYMENTS IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM THAT DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACT THE POOR 7 (2015), https://obamawhiteho
use.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/1215_cea_fine_fee_bail_issue_brief.pdf
[hereinafter FINES, FEES, AND BAIL].
7 See, e.g., SELLING OFF OUR FREEDOM, supra note 3, at 18 (finding a Prison Policy Initiative
study also found that Black men aged 23-39 who were held in local jails earned a median income
$900 in the month prior to their arrest and black women in the same age group earned a median
income of only $568 in the month before detention); FINES, FEES, AND BAIL, supra note 6, at 6,
7 (citing a 2012 Virginia study that found that 92% of arrestees were unable to post a bail below
$5,000); Lael Henterly, When Bail Is Set, the Rich Walk and the Poor Go to Jail, SEATTLE WKLY.
(Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.seattleweekly.com/news/when-bail-is-set-the-rich-walk-and-thepoor-go-to-jail/ (discussing a 2015 study which found that 31% of misdemeanor detainees in
Seattle, Washington, could not post the cash bail imposed).
8 See ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1110–11 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (discussing
the fact that the maximum bail that can be imposed for misdemeanor cases pursuant to the
bail schedule in Harris County, Texas is $5000).
9 See FINES, FEES, AND BAIL, supra note 6, at 6; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF
FREEDOM: BAIL AND PRETRIAL DETENTION OF LOW INCOME NONFELONY DEFENDANTS IN NEW
YORK CITY 2, 50 (2010) (finding that over a one-year period, 11,000 misdemeanor defendants
were in pretrial detention in New York City because they could not afford to pay a bond of
$1,000 or less) [hereinafter THE PRICE OF FREEDOM].
10 For example, in Georgia, an indigent disabled man was charged with public intoxication,
a minor non-jailable offense that carried a maximum penalty of a $500 fine, and was held in
pretrial detention for six days on a secured money bail of $160 that he could not afford to pay.
See Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-CV-0170, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12305, at *3, *10 (N.D.
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defendants can be held in pretrial detention on nonviolent
misdemeanor charges which are punishable by up to a year in jail,
but will likely result in either dismissal of the charges or, if convicted,
a probationary sentence.11 Moreover, the impact of weeks and
months in pretrial detention is profound. Pretrial detainees are at
risk of losing any stability they had prior to detention.12 Even two or
three days of pretrial detention causes indigent defendants who are
already
experiencing
socioeconomic
disadvantages
(i.e.,
homelessness, mental health disorders, substance abuse) to suffer
greater set-backs, including the loss of employment, public benefits,
child custody.13 Also, detainees are exposed to dangers of physical
and sexual violence as well as disease and poor medical treatment in
jail.14
The legitimacy of cash bail that results in de facto pretrial
detention in low level criminal cases is questionable when there are
readily available nonfinancial forms of pretrial release. Instead of
secure money bail which requires the defendant to post a sum of
money as a precondition of release,15 courts could impose an
unsecured money bail condition and require payment only if the
defendant fails to return to court.16 There are also a host of
nonfinancial conditions of release that could be used to facilitate the
defendant’s release and reappearance.17
Ga. Jan. 28, 2016), vacated, 682 F. Appx. 721 (11th Cir. 2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-95 (2019).
Similarly, Leotha McGruder, an unemployed 22-year-old pregnant mother of two with a special
needs child spent four days in jail on a $5,000 bail following her arrest for failing to identify
herself to a police officer. ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1063 (S.D. Tex. 2017),
aff’d in part and rev’d and vacated in part, 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018). Also, Donya Pierce
who was charged with having a broken headlight, no proof of insurance, failure to produce
driver’s license, and having a suspended license was held in jail on $800 money bail, later
reduced to $650, which she also could not afford to pay. See Pierce v. City of Velda City, No.
4:15-cv-570-HEA, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176261 (E.D. Mo. June 3, 2015); Class Action
Complaint at 3, Pierce v. City of Velda City, No. 4:15-cv-00570 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 2, 2015).
11 See e.g., ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1062, 1063 (holding Ronald Ryan Ford on a $5,000
secure money bond after he was charged with shoplifting).
12 Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69
STAN. L. REV. 711, 713 (2017).
13 See id.; Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 YALE
L.J. 134, 1356–57 (2014).
14 See Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-CV-0170, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12305, at *4
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016), vacated, 682 F. Appx. 721 (11th Cir. 2017) (involving a pretrial
detainee confined to a cell for twenty-three hours a day and not given prescribed medication
for his mental disorder); JUST DETENTION INTERNATIONAL, VULNERABLE DETAINEES:
SURVIVORS OF PREVIOUS SEXUAL ABUSE 1 (2013); The Issue, PENAL REFORM INT’L, https://www.
penalreform.org/priorities/pre-trial-justice/issue/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2019) (“People in pretrial detention are particularly likely to suffer violence and abuse.”).
15 See SCHNACKE, supra note 5, at 2.
16 See id. at 11, 12.
17 Nonfinancial release conditions range from release on personal or signature bond
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The overuse and abuse of money bail by state courts in cases
involving nonviolent indigent defendants, particularly those charged
with petty offenses, is at the center of the national bail reform
movement and the current wave of federal civil rights litigation on
behalf of indigent pretrial detainees. Currently there are over a
dozen state and federal cases challenging wealth-based pretrial
detention.18 In addition, bail reform measures have been proposed or
adopted in more than fifty local jurisdictions, and there are several
state-wide legislative measures under consideration to reduce or
eliminate the use of money bail.19
This article explores the constitutionality and necessity of the use
of money bail in cases involving nonviolent indigent defendants
charged with low-level offenses. Part II explores the legal challenges
that have been raised and discusses the standards and safeguards
that federal courts have imposed to prevent wealth-based pretrial
detention. Part III whether discusses money bail is actually needed
to secure the defendant’s reappearance at future court dates, and
whether there are equally effective alternatives that courts can
utilize to accomplish the goal of preventing failure to appear.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WEALTH-BASED PRETRIAL
DETENTION
Misdemeanor arrestees are often . . . people “living on the
(commonly referred to as personal recognizance, “PR” or “ROR”), which allows the defendant to
be released based on the personal promise to return for future court proceedings. CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SECTION, ABA, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT PRETRIAL RELEASE DECISION
MAKING PROCESS 1 (2016), https://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=25187.
The court could also impose conditions of release designed to prevent an FTA, including
requiring regular check-ins, surrender passport, electronic monitoring, house arrest, and
curfew. See id. at 1 n.2. These conditions are usually monitored by Pretrial Services Agencies
in numerous jurisdictions around the country. See generally 2018 NAPSA Regions and
Regional Directors, RTS. NAT’L ASS’N PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCIES, https://napsa.org/eweb/Dyna
micPage.aspx?Site=NAPSA&WebCode=2018Regions (breaking the United States into six
regions that NAPSA serves).
18 See Challenging the Money Bail System, C.R. CORPS, https://www.civilrightscorps.org/wor
k/wealth-based-detention (last visited Apr. 12, 2019) (referencing multiple challenges to
wealth-based detention cases across the United States).
19 See Megan T. Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case
Outcomes, 34 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 511, 538 (2016) (noting bail reform measures in New Jersey,
Kentucky, Colorado, Maryland, New Mexico, California, and New York); see also Lexi
Churchill, Bail Will Go Down in Missouri Courts Under New Reform Plan, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/missouri-sup
reme-court-chief-justice-fischer-announces-reform-of-bail/article_09e3a26d-2c1a-57c2-b79668bbf7aa1930.html (“The new [Missouri] rules . . . limit how long a defendant can be
detained . . . [and] limit a court’s ability to order payments in the first place.”).
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edge at the point in their lives that intersects with getting
involved in an arrest.” . . . [T]hey may be homeless. They may
lack family, friends, and [resources]. Some are, no doubt, of
bad reputation and present a risk of nonappearance or of new
criminal activity. But they are not without constitutional
rights to due process and the equal protection of the law.20
A. The Bail Determination Process
The current constitutional challenges to money bail practices in
state courts begin with the dysfunction in the initial setting of bail by
the court.21 While the bail-setting process varies,22 bail hearings from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction are fairly consistent.23 Bail determinations
have devolved into a purely informal processing function in the
criminal adjudication process.24 The initial bail hearing in most
places takes less than five minutes.25 Frequently, the amount of
money bail imposed has been rigidly established by a pre-set bail
schedule that assigns a dollar amount to each criminal charge.26 Too
often when bail is initially set, the defendant does not have a
lawyer,27 there is no judge presiding over the bail hearing,28 and the
defendant watches the hearing on a television screen from the jail. 29
In many jurisdictions the information on the defendant’s background
and criminal history—critical facts needed for courts to make an
informed decision on whether the defendant poses a risk of flight—is

ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1167 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
See Q&A: Pretrial Incarceration, Bail and Profile Based Risk Assessment in the United
States, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 1, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/01/q-pretrial-inca
rceration-bail-and-profile-based-risk-assessment-united-states (asserting that informal and
rapid bail hearing procedures often lead to unsound and biased determinations).
22 See Megan T. Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Pretrial Detention and Bail, in 3
REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL 21, 28 (Erik Luna ed., 2017), http://acade
myforjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Reforming-Criminal-Justice_Vol_3.pdf.
23 See id. at 25–26.
24 See id. at 23.
25 See, e.g., ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1092 (stating that most bail hearings take one to
two minutes); Auerlie Ouss & Meghan T. Stevenson, Evaluating the Impacts of Eliminating
Prosecutorial Requests for Cash Bail 6 (George Mason Legal Studies Research Paper No. LS
19-08, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3335138 (discussing bail
hearings in Philadelphia conducted via video conference with a magistrate who is not a lawyer,
as well as non-lawyer representatives of the DA’s office and the public defender office and lasted
one to two minutes).
26 See Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 22, at 25.
27 See ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1093; Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 22, at 25.
28 See Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 22, at 25.
29 See ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1092 (involving a hearing officer who connects via video
with prosecutor’s office and the county jail where the defendant is brought before the camera
when the case is called); Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 22, at 25.
20
21
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simply not available at the time bail is set30 because often there is no
pretrial services agency to gather this information and present it to
the court prior to the bail determination.31 Thus, little to no time is
expended making an individualized determination of whether the
defendant is a flight risk.32 Likewise, there is no discussion or
consideration of whether the defendant has the ability to pay the
money bail or whether there are non-financial alternatives that will
assure the defendant’s appearance at future court hearings.33 This
indifference to the fact that the money bail imposed could result in
weeks and months of pretrial detention for someone facing very
minor charges continues during the subsequent perfunctory judicial
review of bail days later when the judge could, but usually does not,
make an individualized assessment of whether the defendant is a
flight risk and reduce or eliminate the cash bail.34
Courts have a legitimate basis for imposing pretrial detention
when there is evidence that a defendant is violent and poses a risk of
danger to the community.35 In cases where the defendant poses no
risk of danger to the community, however, the only legal basis for
imposing money bail is securing the defendant’s appearance at future
court hearings, or reducing the risk that that the defendant will flee
the jurisdiction.36 Thus, the blanket use of secure money bail as a
release condition for all defendants unfairly assumes that each and
every person arrested is automatically a flight risk and will not
return to court when ordered without an upfront payment of cash
bail.37
The long term impact the bail decision are potentially significant
because the outcome of the bail hearing could determine the outcome
of the entire case. There is also a growing body of empirical data
which shows that those subjected to pretrial detention suffer harsher
See id. at 932.
See id.
32 See, e.g., Cynthia E. Jones, Criminal Justice in the 21st Century: Eliminating Racial and
Ethnic Disparity in the Criminal Justice System: “Give Us Free”: Addressing Racial Disparities
in Bail Determinations, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 919, 932, 933 (2013).
33 See id. at 932.
34 See id. at 934, 935–36.
35 See THE PRICE OF FREEDOM, supra note 9, at 2.
36 Bandy v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 197, 197 (1960) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 80
S. Ct. 30, 32 (1959)) (“‘[T]he purpose of bail is to insure the defendant’s appearance and
submission to the judgment of the court.’ It is assumed that the threat of forfeiture of one’s
goods will be an effective deterrent to the temptation to break the conditions of one’s release.”).
37 See ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1103 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (conveying a
Harris County judge testified that even if she learned that secured money bail provides no
financial incentive to comply with the conditions of release, it would not change her subjective
belief that secured money bail is better).
30
31
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outcomes in their pending criminal cases than do defendants released
pretrial.38 In ODonnell v. Harris County, a federal civil rights lawsuit
brought on behalf of indigent pretrial detainees, the judge found that
defendants in pretrial detention are pressured to plead guilty by the
prosecution in exchange for quick release from jail and threatened
with sentencing enhancements if they do not accept the plea.39 The
court also noted that the case dismissal rate is 13% for pretrial
detainees, but 32% for those released pending trial.40 Moreover, the
court found that detainees are 25% more likely to be convicted and
43% more likely to be sentenced to a period of incarceration than
those released pretrial, and the sentences imposed on detainees are
twice as long as released defendants with the same criminal charges
and criminal history and background.41 The court concluded:
[T]housands of misdemeanor defendants each year are
voluntarily pleading guilty knowing that they are choosing a
conviction with fast release over exercising their right to trial at
the cost of prolonged detention. This Hobson’s choice is, the
evidence shows, the predictable effect of imposing secured money
bail on indigent misdemeanor defendants.42
Without consideration of the defendant’s ability to pay thee cash
bail or consideration of whether non-financial conditions of release
could be imposed to secure the defendant’s reappearance, the cash
bail practices in state courts allow defendants with means to
purchase their pretrial freedom, while indigent defendants are forced
into pretrial detention. As discussed in more detail below, bail reform
advocates have successfully argued that this use of cash bail results
in unconstitutional wealth-based detention.
B. The Constitutional Crisis in Money Bail
By 2015, ten class actions lawsuits were filed on behalf of indigent
pretrial detainees in eight states throughout the South, including
38 See, e.g., Megan T. Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects
Case Outcomes, 34 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 511, 512–13 (2016); Heaton et al., supra note 12, at 786–
87; Arpit Gupta et al., The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization, 45
J. LEGAL STUD. 471, 472 (2016); Cynthia E. Jones, “Give Us Free”: Addressing Racial
Disparities in Bail Determinations, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 919, 936–37 (2013).
39 ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1104–05 (S.D. Tex. 2017), aff’d in part and
rev’d and vacated in part, 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018).
40 Id. at 1105.
41 Id. at 1106.
42 Id. at 1107.
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counties and cities in Alabama, Louisiana, Missouri, Mississippi,
Georgia, and Tennessee.43 By 2017, additional bail reform lawsuits
were filed in California, Texas, Illinois, and Massachusetts.44 In
some of these cases the federal court has enjoined the challenged
money bail practices.45 Other cases have been resolved by a
settlement agreement that ushered in sweeping changes to bail
practices, including the elimination of money bail for petty offenses.46
The central issue that emerges from the bail reform litigation is
what constitutional protection exists when courts, solely to assure
reappearance, impose cash bail that predictably results in pretrial
detention only for indigent defendants who are unable to pay for their
pretrial freedom. These state and federal cases have focused almost
exclusively on indigent defendants facing very petty offenses. The
government does not contend that pretrial detention was warranted
because the defendant is violent or poses a risk of danger to the
community. Thus, in each case the court focused on how to balance
the state court’s compelling interest in assuring reappearance with
the defendant’s fundamental interest in pretrial freedom. What has
emerged from the litigation is a constitutional framework and a set
of mandated safeguards that constrain the ability of courts to impose
cash bail that will result in wealth-based pretrial detention.
1. Prohibition Against Wealth-Based Detention
A trio of United States Supreme Court cases provide the foundation
for challenging wealth-based pretrial detention.47 The first case is
Williams v. Illinois.48 In Williams, the defendant was convicted of
theft, sentenced to the maximum penalty of one year in prison, and
assessed $505 in fines and court costs.49 By statute, if the financial
obligation was not satisfied at the expiration of his imprisonment, the
defendant would be required to remain in prison to work off the debt

43
PETER EDELMAN, NOT A CRIME TO BE POOR: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY IN
AMERICA 60–61 (2017).
44 Id. at 61.
45 See, e.g., ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 321 F. Supp. 3d 763, 765, 778 (S.D. Tex. 2018), aff’d in
part and rev’d and vacated in part, 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018); Schultz v. Alabama, 330 F.
Supp. 3d. 1344, 1365, 1376 (N.D. Ala. 2018).
46 See CTR. FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE, GA. STATE UNIV. COLL. OF LAW, MISDEMEANOR BAIL
REFORM AND LITIGATION: AN OVERVIEW 10 (2017).
47 See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams
v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
48 See Williams, 399 U.S. at 236.
49 See id.
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at a rate of $5 per day.50 The Court ruled that the aggregate
imprisonment cannot exceed the maximum period fixed by statute
due to involuntary nonpayment of a fine or court costs.51 This, the
Court stated, would constitute “impermissible discrimination that
rests on ability to pay.”52 The Court recognized that in making the
length of sentence “contingent upon one’s ability to pay, the State has
visited different consequences on two categories of persons.”53 The
Court ruled that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits this form of differential treatment based on
“economic status.”54 The Court also stated that “[s]ince only a
convicted person with access to funds can avoid the increased
imprisonment, the Illinois statute in operative effect exposes only
indigents to” extended imprisonment.55
In Tate v. Short, the Court addressed whether an indigent
defendant unable to pay the fines imposed for non-jailable traffic
offenses could be sent to a municipal prison farm to work off his
debt.56 Citing Williams, the Court reaffirmed the principle that a
person cannot be imprisoned solely because of his impecunity.57 The
Court ruled that, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, the
State cannot “limit the punishment to payment of the fine if one is
able to pay it, yet convert the fine into a prison term for an indigent
defendant without the means to pay his fine.”58
Finally, in Bearden v. Georgia, an indigent defendant was placed
on probation and assessed fines and restitution as a condition of
probation.59 When Bearden lost his job and was unable to pay the
outstanding balance owed, his probation was revoked.60 The Court
found that the state court’s action in revoking probation was “no more
than imprisoning a person solely because he lacks funds to pay the
fine, a practice we condemned in Williams and Tate.”61
Although the holdings in Williams and Tate were both rooted in
the Equal Protection Clause, the Bearden Court found that “Due
process and equal protection principles converge in the Court’s
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

See id.
See id. at 240–41.
Id. at 241.
Id. at 242.
Id. at 244.
Id. at 242.
See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 396–97 (1971).
See id. at 397–98 (citing Williams, 399 U.S. 235).
Tate, 401 U.S. at 399.
See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 662 (1983).
See id. at 662–63.
Id. at 674.
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analysis in these cases” because the Court generally analyses “the
fairness of relations between the criminal defendant and the State
under the Due Process Clause, while we approach the question
whether the State has invidiously denied one class of defendants a
substantial benefit available to another class of defendants under the
Equal Protection Clause.”62
2. Application of Wealth-Based Detention Standards to Pretrial
Detention
Post-Bearden, the Court’s analysis of post-conviction wealth-based
detention has been extended to the pretrial context. Thus far, only
two federal circuit courts—the Fifth Circuit and the Eleventh
Circuit—have applied the Bearden analysis to pretrial detention
based on inability to pay cash bail.
In the Fifth Circuit, the first case to rule on the constitutional
protection for pretrial detainees was Pugh v. Rainwater.63 In Pugh,
indigent pretrial detainees unable to pay money bail asserted that
the bail laws in the State of Florida violated their right to equal
protection secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.64 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the heavy
burden pretrial confinement places on “one who is accused but not
convicted,”65 and found that “imprisonment solely because of indigent
status is invidious discrimination and not constitutionally
permissible.”66 The bail procedures in place at the time the plaintiffs
were detained were replaced by court rule during the pendency of the
litigation.67 The court found that the newly-adopted bail procedures
effectively cured the constitutional deficiencies by mandating
alternatives to money bail, requiring the court to make
individualized assessments of each defendant, and mandating that
judges consider six different types of pretrial release, including
personal recognizance, unsecured money bail, third-party custody,
and other non-financial community supervision alternatives.68
In the most recent case from the Fifth Circuit, ODonnell v. Harris
County, misdemeanor pretrial detainees sought injunctive relief to
62 Id. at 665 (first citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956); then citing Ross v. Moffitt,
417 U.S. 600, 608–09 (1974)).
63 See Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1055–56 (5th Cir. 1978).
64 See id.
65 Id. at 1056.
66 Id. (first citing Williams, 399 U.S. 235; then citing Tate, 401 U.S. 395).
67 See Pugh, 572 F.2d at 1055, 1059.
68 See id. at 1055 n.2.

ACCUSED AND UNCONVICTED

2018/2019]

5/28/2019 2:04 PM

Wealth-Based Pretrial Detention

1073

halt the manner in which secure money bail was imposed in
misdemeanor cases in Harris County, Texas.69 After the United
States District Court held an eight-day evidentiary hearing where
numerous fact and expert witnesses testified and the court reviewed
hundreds of exhibits and thousands of recordings of Harris County
bail hearings, the court issued an exhaustive 120-page order
enjoining Harris County’s secure money bail practices.70 The
ODonnell court framed the issues as: “Can a jurisdiction impose
secure money bail on misdemeanor arrestees who cannot pay it, who
would otherwise be released, effectively ordering their pretrial
detention? If so, what do due process and equal protection require
for that to be lawful?”71 The court held that when the government is
only using secure money bail to facilitate reappearance and not
punishment or community safety, the government’s interest deserves
less deference when balanced against the liberty interests of
defendants who are only charged with misdemeanors, do not pose a
safety risk to the community, and are presumed innocent.72
The court held that “Harris County has a . . . policy and practice of
imposing secured money bail as de facto orders of pretrial detention
in misdemeanor cases.”73 The court also found that neither the
hearing officers nor the judges who review bail determinations make
individualized assessments of the particular circumstances for each
defendant as demanded under federal law.74 The court found that
although equal protection challenges based on wealth-based
classifications are generally evaluated on a rational basis standard,
when the wealth-based classification results in detention, heightened
scrutiny is required.75 Applying Bearden, the court held that when
imposing a secured money bail that results in pretrial detention in
misdemeanor cases, the state must make a finding that the
defendant has the ability to pay and make a finding that there are no
other reasonable alternatives for accomplishing the State’s
compelling interest in assuring reappearance.76
69 See ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147, 152 (5th Cir. 2018); ODonnell v. Harris Cty.,
251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1058, 1059, 1067, 1080 (S.D. Tex. 2017), aff’d in part and rev’d and
vacated in part, 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018).
70 See ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 152, 153; ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1067, 1068.
71 ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1059.
72 See id. at 1136.
73 See id. at 1060.
74 See id. at 1107–08, 1130.
75 See id. at 1134, 1138 (citing Pugh v. Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1189, 1197 (5th Cir. 1977), rev’d,
572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978)).
76 See ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1140 (citing Bearden, 461 U.S. at 674). The District
Court concluded that plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on the merits because, among
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The court ruled that “secured money bail may serve to detain
indigent misdemeanor arrestees only in the narrowest of cases, and
only when . . . due process safeguards” are in place to protect the
rights of the accused.77 The court found that Harris County’s bail
practices did not comply with procedural due process standards for
the denial of the fundamental right to pretrial liberty.78 The
ODonnell court held that procedural due process requires:
(1) notice that the financial and other resource information its
officers collect is for the purpose of determining the
misdemeanor arrestee’s eligibility for release or detention; (2)
a hearing at which the arrestee has an opportunity to be heard
and to present evidence; (3) an impartial decision maker; and
(4) a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence
relied on to find that a secured financial condition is the only
reasonable way to assure the arrestee’s appearance at [future]
hearings.79
The court also mandated that the detention hearing occur within
twenty-four hours.80
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld the lower court’s ruling on
equal protection, but overruled two aspects of the district court’s
ruling on procedural due process standards.81 The Fifth Circuit held
that the 24-hour rule for detention hearings and the requirement of
written findings was too onerous.82 Instead, the appellate court
allowed up to 48 hours post-arrest for the court to make the ability to
pay determination, and permitted the court make oral, not written,
findings following detention hearings.83
Similarly, in Walker v. City of Calhoun, the Eleventh Circuit
other reasons, there are a panoply of alternatives to the use of secured money bail that are as
good or more effective to address the government’s reappearance goal, including unsecured
bond and nonfinancial conditions of release. See ODonnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1140, 1152–53.
Since the government admitted that secured money bond in misdemeanor cases was not
imposed to address the problem of future dangerousness, the court rejected the government’s
contention that secured money bail was the only way (or the best way) to assure the defendant
would return to court. See id. at 1140, 1152–53.
77 See id. at 1059.
78 See id. at 1059–60.
79 Id. at 1145.
80 See id. at 1060.
81 See ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147, 152 (5th Cir. 2018).
82 See id. at 160 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 565 (1974)).
83 See ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 152, 160 (affirming and incorporating the findings of the lower
court that the secured bail practices of Harris County violate both due process and equal
protection rights of misdemeanor defendants).
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reviewed plaintiffs’ § 1983 civil rights challenge to the use of secured
money bail that resulted in their de facto pretrial detention in
Calhoun, Georgia.84 As in ODonnell, the indigent Walker plaintiffs
sought injunctive relief on the grounds that the bail laws created
unconstitutional wealth-based detention in violation of their rights
to equal protection and due process secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.85 Under the bail
policies in existence at the time of arrest, indigent defendants in
Calhoun were required to post secure money bail and, if unable to
pay, remain in jail until a court hearing four to five days later. A few
months after plaintiffs filed suit, a new standing order on bail was
issued. Under the new bail order, indigent defendants unable to pay
secure money bail are brought to court within forty-eight hours for a
counseled adversarial hearing for the court to make an individualized
determination on bail and provide an opportunity for the accused to
object to the bail amount and assert a claim of indigency. Also, if the
court finds the accused to be indigent, the new bail order mandates
that the accused be released on personal recognizance without paying
the secured bail amount.86 The district court ruled that “[t]he bail
policy under which Plaintiff was arrested clearly is unconstitutional.
Further, although the Standing Order attempts to remedy the
deficiencies of the earlier bail policy, it simply shortens the amount
of time that indigent arrestees are held in jail to forty-eight hours.”87
The federal district court enjoined the defendants from keeping
indigent arrestees in jail solely because they cannot afford to pay
secured money bail amounts and subsequently ordered defendants,
as soon as possible following arrest, to ascertain pretrial defendants’
ability to pay through use of an affidavit of indigency.88
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that the City of
Calhoun’s newly-adopted standing order on bail complied with the
due process and equal protection rights of pretrial detainees.89 The
court found that 48-hour detention, as opposed to 24-hour detention,
was constitutional, and found that the district court’s proscribed
affidavit of indigency was not constitutionally-required because the
84 See Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1251–52, 1256 (11th Cir. 2018); id. at 1274
(Martin, J., dissenting).
85 See id. at 1251–52, 1269.
86 Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-CV-0170-HLM, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12305, at *12,
*14–15 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016). The standing order also provided that, if charged with traffic
or city ordinance offenses, the accused will be release on unsecured bond. See id. at *15, *16.
87 Id. at *36.
88 See id. at *13.
89 See Walker, 901 F.3d at 1262, 1266, 1268–69, 1272.
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City could, pursuant to the Standing Order, simply hold a hearing
48-hours after detention to determine indigency.90
3. Analysis
i. Constitutional Standards Post-Walker and ODonnell
While plaintiffs in Walker and ODonnell mounted a number of
constitutional arguments against the procedures used to impose
secure cash bail,91 the equal protection challenges raised in both
cases have created a conflict among the two federal circuit courts that
may eventually be resolved by the United States Supreme Court.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution states that “No state shall . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”92 Laws
that divide people into separate classes and either confer a benefit or
impose a burden on one group can run afoul of the Equal Protection
Clause if the government classification is not tailored to meet the
government objective.93 In the context of wealth-based pretrial
detention, the equal protection classification was framed by the Fifth
Circuit in ODonnell as follows:
[T]ake two . . . arrestees who are identical in every way—same
charge, same criminal backgrounds, same circumstances, etc.—
except that one is wealthy and one is indigent . . . . One arrestee
is able to post bond, and the other is not. As a result, the wealthy
arrestee is less likely to plead guilty, more likely to receive a
shorter sentence or be acquitted, and less likely to bear the social
costs of incarceration. The poor arrestee, by contrast, must bear
the brunt of all of these, simply because he has less money than
his wealthy counterpart.94
The Supreme Court has developed a three-tiered analysis for
evaluating discrimination claims under the Equal Protection Clause:
strict scrutiny (generally reserved for race-based and “suspect class”
See id. at 1266–67, 1269.
See generally, Kellen Funk, The Present Crisis in American Bail, 128 YALE L.J. 1098,
1102–10 (discussing substantive due process and procedural due process challenges to pretrial
detention).
92 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
93 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 642–44 (2d ed.
2002).
94 ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147, 163 (5th Cir. 2018).
90
91
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classifications); intermediate scrutiny (primarily applied to genderbased classifications); and rational basis scrutiny, (the default or
“catch-all” standard for all other classifications).95 The conflict
among the Fifth and Eleventh circuits that has emerged from the bail
reform litigation involves whether strict scrutiny or rational basis
scrutiny should be applied to challenges to wealth-based pretrial
detention.
a. Strict Scrutiny
Strict scrutiny, the most exacting review, places the burden on the
government to show that the classification is “necessary” to achieve
a “compelling” government interest.96 The government bears the
burden of showing that there are no other less discriminatory
alternatives to achieve its objective.97 The ODonnell court was very
found that a “heightened” scrutiny applied to the equal protection
challenges to money bail mounted by pretrial detainees, but the court
never stated clarified whether it was applying intermediate scrutiny
or strict scrutiny. In demanding that government demonstrate that
secure cash bail was the most effective way to accomplish its
objective, the ODonnell it appears that the applied strict scrutiny.98
In fact, the ODonnell court found that that, while economic
distinctions are generally subject to a much less demanding level of
review and justification, wealth-based classifications that impact the
fundamental right to liberty demand heightened scrutiny.99
Professor Kellen Funk agreed with the ODonnell court and
reasoned that either strict or “heightened” scrutiny is the most
appropriate:
If heightened scrutiny, narrow tailoring, and a substantive
finding of necessity protect convicted indigent defendants, they
surely ought to apply in the pretrial context, where the
presumption of innocence and a defendant’s ability to prepare for
trial are most vulnerable. . . . municipal systems that detain forty

See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 93, at 645–46.
See id. at 645.
97 Id.
98 See ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 161–62, 164 (first quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20 (1973); then quoting Doe v. Veneman, 380 F.3d 807, 818 (5th Cir.
2007)).
99 See ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 161–62 (quoting Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 821–22 (5th
Cir. 1997)).
95
96
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percent of misdemeanor defendants until the termination of their
proceedings—as Harris County did—should at a minimum be
subjected to heightened review.100
Under the strict scrutiny microscope, it is extremely unlikely that the
secured money bail practices under review in ODonnell and Walker—
and common throughout the country—would survive an equal
protection challenge. Even though the government’s interest in court
reappearance is compelling, the government would not be able to
meet it burden of showing that secure money bail is “necessary,” nor
could they establish that there are no other alternatives to cash bail
that would assure reappearance and not subject indigents to pretrial
detention. As discussed more fully in Part III, below, numerous nonfinancial alternatives to secure cash bail exist and have been
successfully implemented in jurisdictions across the country without
any decrease in reappearance rates.
b. Rational Basis
The lowest level of scrutiny for equal protection claims is rational
basis. Under rational basis scrutiny the aggrieved party—not the
government—bears the burden of showing that the government
classification is arbitrary or not a rational means to achieve the
government objective.101 Under a rational basis analysis, the oftstated contention that secure money bail provides a financial
incentive for pretrial defendants to return to court would likely be
enough of a rational justification for the use of money bail to pass
muster. Secure money bail—even if it results in unwarranted
pretrial detention of indigents—is rationally related to the
government’s goal of assuring the defendant’s reappearance at future
court hearings.
The Walker court, confronted with virtually the same equal
protection challenge raised in ODonnell, expressly rejected the notion
that any level of heightened scrutiny should be applied.102 The court
reasoned that “differential treatment by wealth is constitutionally
impermissible only where it results in an absolute deprivation of a
benefit because of poverty.”103 The court found that because indigent

100
101
102
103

Funk, supra note 91, at 1118.
CHEMERINSKI, supra note 93, at 645–46.
See Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1260 11th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1261, 1262 (emphasis in original) (citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 20).
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detainees would be eligible for release on personal recognizance or
unsecured money bail after 48 hours of pretrial detention, they
suffered only a “mere diminishment”—as opposed to an absolute
deprivation— of a right to pretrial release. The court reasoned that
indigent detainees “must merely wait some appropriate amount of
time to receive the same benefit as the more affluent.” Specifically,
the court stated that the Equal Protection Clause did not prohibit the
government from offering “comparatively speedier release” to those
able to pay the money bail.104
c. “Heightened Rational Basis” Scrutiny
While the Supreme Court has held fast to the notion that there are
only three levels of scrutiny applied to equal protection claims, legal
scholars and jurists have long recognized a fourth tier of scrutiny,
sometimes referred to as rational basis “with bite.”105 Legal scholars
have described this unofficial “fourth tier” of scrutiny as “upgrading”
rational basis by “reducing the deference” that the court normally
accords to the government’s justification and requiring more than
mere rationality.106 The Supreme Court overtly and covertly applied
heightened rational basis scrutiny in cases that did not fit neatly into
either of the three levels of scrutiny. In Plyer v. Doe, a Texas statute
mandated de-funding the public education of children who were not
“legally-admitted” into the United States.107 The state’s proffered
justification was the desire to preserve limited resources for the
education of lawful residents.108 The Court held:
In determining the rationality of [the statute] we may take into
account its costs . . . to the innocent children who are its victims.
In light of these countervailing costs, the discrimination

104 Walker, 901 F.3d at 1272. The court repeatedly analogizes pretrial detention of indigents
based on their inability to pay bail to other commercial transactions that citizens voluntarily
engage in with the government, i.e., paying tuition at a state school or paying extra money at
the post office for express mail. Id. at 1263–64. These comparisons to voluntary commercial
transactions with the government for optional goods and services is vastly different from being
locked in a cage for two days because you are too poor to purchase your pretrial freedom. Unlike
the perks that a person is not otherwise entitled to receive from the government, pretrial liberty
is a fundamental right that should not be available only to those who can afford to purchase it.
105 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 93, at 647.
106 Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of
Scrutiny, 45 OHIO L.J. 161 (1984).
107 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982).
108 Id. at 209.

ACCUSED AND UNCONVICTED

1080

5/28/2019 2:04 PM

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 82.3

contained in [the statute] can hardly be considered rational
unless it furthers some substantial goal of the State.109
The Court’s command that the statute further a “substantial goal”
of the state is a far greater standard than simple rationality. In fact,
the language of the Court is must more akin to the strict scrutiny
standard that requires the government action to be “necessary” to
advance an “important” objective.
The Court has also applied a heightened rational basis analysis in
prohibiting the government from denying food stamps to unrelated
persons who lived together,110 and in rejecting the State of Alaska’s
plan for distributing greater dividends from government oil revenues
to some residents of the state who had lived in the state for a longer
period of time.111 In each case, the Court demanded more than a mere
“rational” justification. Moreover, Justice Marshall, in lamenting the
rigidity of the three tiered analysis, applauded opinions of the Court
that “adjusted” the level of scrutiny when justice demanded
application of a more nuanced approach.112
Based on the bail reform litigated over the past five years, federal
courts are struggling with setting the level of scrutiny for equal
protection challenges to wealth-based pretrial detention. Thus far,
several courts have skirted the issue by applying an undefined
“heightened” scrutiny and requiring the government to provide more
than a mere rational justification for the use of cash bail procedures
that result in de facto pretrial detention for the indigent.113 At the
other end of the spectrum, in order to make wealth-based pretrial
detention fit into a rational basis tier, Walker court engaged in a
strained analysis that focused exclusively on the economic
classification that stemmed from the defendant’s inability to pay the
money bail, yet disregarded the constitutional significance of the loss
of pretrial liberty suffered pretrial detainees.
Bearden provides the foundation to deviate from a traditional basis
or strict scrutiny dichotomy and analyze pretrial detention under the
analytical framework better suited for this issue. While Bearden

Id. at 224.
U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
111 Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
112 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 109–10 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (“…this court has consistently adjusted the care with which it will review state
discrimination in light of the constitutional significance of the interests affected and the
invidiousness of the particular classification.”).
113 E.g., ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147, 154 (5th Cir. 2018).
109
110
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would not “pigeonhole” its analysis into strict scrutiny or rational
bases, the court’s analysis exceeds the bounds of rational basis
scrutiny. The Bearden Court did not give deferential treatment to
the justifications advanced by the court.
Instead, the court
scrutinized and expressly rejected each of the state’s articulated
reasons for the classification.114 The Court also detailed a series of
less restrictive alternatives to incarceration. At a minimum, the
Bearden Court applied a heightened level of rational basis scrutiny
that extended well beyond the characteristic deference to the
government under a rational basis analysis.
In the context of indigency-based pretrial detention, this
“heightened” rational basis scrutiny could provide a comfortable
doctrinal solution for the judicial discomfort with strict scrutiny and
provide a stronger foundation for the proper analysis of pretrial
detention based on secure money bail. If courts demand more than
any rational justification from the government, the existence of
alternatives to secure money bail will become significant. The
growing body of research and empirical studies from jurisdictions
across the country, discussed in Part III, provide ample evidence that
there are less restrictive alternatives to imposing money bail to
secure reappearance, especially in cases involving low-level offenses.
ii. The Constitutional Standards for Wealth-Based Pretrial
Detention
Post-Walker and ODonnell, city and county courts must scrutinize
whether the exclusive reliance on cash bail as a condition of pretrial
release functions as wealth-based detention for indigent defendants
who cannot pay cash bail.115 While neither court prohibited the use
of cash bail or the use of fixed bail schedules to establish the amount
of bail for each crime, both courts imposed safeguards designed to
prevent low-level defendants from being subjected to pretrial
detention solely because they are poor. The minimum constitutional
safeguards approved by both courts should serve as a guide to state
and local courts in evaluating and reforming how secure money bail
is used in setting pretrial release conditions.

114
115

Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 670–72 (1983).
See ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 154.
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a. No Exclusive Reliance on Secure Money Bail
Secure money bail should be one of many options available to the
court in setting pretrial release. In Walker, it was the existence of
non-financial alternatives in the new standing order that the court
relied on in finding that the post-standing order bail practices were
constitutional.116 Similarly, in ODonnell, one factor that the court
relied heavily upon in condemning the state court’s bail practices was
the fact that the judicial officers automatically imposed secure money
bail without any consideration of alternatives or whether the money
bail would result in the defendant’s detention.117
b. Making an “Ability to Pay” Finding
Both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits ruled that courts are required
to make an ability to pay determination within 48 hours if secure
money bail results in pretrial detention for an indigent defendant.118
While both courts permitted the initial bail determination to be made
without a finding that the defendant was able to pay, the routine
perfunctory judicial review of bail that generally occurs at some
unspecified later date in the case will no longer suffice under the
constitutional standards set forth in Walker and ODonnell.119 Both
courts mandate that within 48 hours of detention, a finding is made
regarding whether the defendant is indigent and whether the
defendant has the ability to pay the secure money bail imposed. At
a minimum, courts will have to develop a process for making this
determination. Some suggestions discussed in the district court and
circuit court opinions in Walker and ODonnell included an indigency
affidavit, information collected by the pretrial services workers, or
using federal indigency standards.120 Finally, while neither court
mandated that counsel be provided, the standing order on bail upheld
by the court in Walker provided for a counseled hearing.121

116 See Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1260 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Pugh v.
Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057, 1058 (5th Cir. 1978)).
117 See ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 882 F.3d 528, 541 (5th Cir. 2018), withdrawn, 892 F.3d 147
(5th Cir. 2018).
118 See Walker, 901 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Bearden, 461 U.S. at 661); ODonnell, 892 F.3d at
153.
119 See ODonnell, 882 F.3d at 541, 543.
120 See Walker, 901 F.3d at 1252; ODonnell, 882 F.3d at 546; ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 251
F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1153, 1168 (S.D. Tex. 2017), aff’d in part and rev’d and vacated in part, 892
F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018).
121 See Walker, 901 F.3d at 1252.
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c. Alternative Release Options Based on the Inability to Pay
If the court finds that the defendant is indigent and does not have
the ability to pay the secure money bail imposed, the court must
consider whether reasonable alternatives exist to achieve the court’s
goal of assuring reappearance. Neither opinion states that an
inability to pay finding requires that the indigent defendant be
released. However, the revised bail scheme adopted in Calhoun
during the Walker litigation provided for release on unsecured bail if
the defendant was unable to pay.
Courts could avoid the burden of implementing these
constitutional safeguards by simply eliminating the use of secure
money bail based solely on securing reappearance, and not safety.
This would effectively eliminate the use of money bail in all minor
traffic and petty misdemeanor offenses and allow low-risk defendant
to be granted non-financial release. Unsecured money bail would
also alleviate the courts of the requirement to comply with the
constitutional safeguards mandated when secured cash bail is used
to set conditions of release. Alternatively, as in the District of
Columbia, courts could adopt a rule which provides that financial
conditions of release cannot be imposed solely to secure reappearance
if it will result in pretrial detention.122
III. MONEY BAIL AND FLIGHT RISK
The Supreme Court has found that securing the defendant’s
presence at court proceedings is a compelling government interest.123
Each criminal court proceeding requires coordination by several
different government agencies—the court, the defense, the
prosecutor, the police, the clerk’s office—to supply information,
evidence, and resources to advance or resolve the case.124 A missed
court date, regardless of the reason, unduly disrupts this process125
and causes the case to be rescheduled on another day when the court

122 D.C. CODE § 23-1321(c)(3) (“A judicial officer may not impose a financial condition . . . to
assure the safety of any person or the community, but may impose such a financial condition
to reasonably assure the defendant’s presence at all court proceedings that does not result in
the preventive detention of the person ….”).
123 See Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1106 (2016) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
124 See, e.g., Steps in a Criminal Case, MONROE COUNTY MICH., https://www.co.monroe.mi.us
/officials_and_departments/officials/prosecuting_attorney/steps_in_a_prosecution.php
(last
visited Apr. 19, 2019).
125 See Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 690, 690 n.60 (2018).
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calendar is already backlogged and congested,126 requires the
prosecutor and the defense attorney to coordinate their trial
schedules once again and re-subpoena witnesses to come back to
court on the new court date.127 This entire process could result in
months-long delay in the resolution of the case. Thus, the court’s
interest in judicial efficiency and respect for the tribunal demand the
defendant’s strict compliance with orders to return to court. The
court’s heavy reliance on money bail to accomplish this goal, however,
is both heavy-handed and unjust when viable alternatives exist.
The money-based bail systems in state courts unfairly and
unjustifiably proceeds on the assumption that, if released, all
arrestees will not return for future court dates unless they have a
vested financial interest in their pretrial release. Starting from this
premise, state courts adopt policies and procedures to automatically
and reflexively impose money bail conditions on all pretrial
defendants. The flawed assumption that money bail is the needed
and effective to prevent failure to appear has been restated and
perpetuated as a bedrock principle without any empirical evidence or
data.128 In fact, there is a growing body of empirical evidence which
establishes that: (A) money bail is not necessary to manage pretrial
release and reappearance;129 (B) other existing legal consequences
that flow the failure to appear provide strong incentive to return to
court; and (C) the use of money bail does not incentivize the indigent
or address the actual causes of failure to appear among low-level
offenders.130
A. Money Bail Is Not Necessary to Assure Reappearance
In several diverse jurisdictions across the country where money
bail is either not used, rarely used, or significantly de-prioritized
among pretrial release options, there is significant empirical
evidence that there is a low failure to appear rate among defendants

126 See id.; Wayne A. Logan, Policing Police Access to Criminal Justice Data, 104 IOWA L.
REV. 620, 642 (2019).
127 See NANCY VER STEEGH, 10 STEPS FOR PRESENTING EVIDENCE IN COURT 6 (2016); How
Do Criminal Defense Attorney’s Prepare for Trial?, MAREIN AND BRADLEY, http://www.mareinan
dbradley.com/how-do-criminal-defense-attorneys-prepare-for-trial/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2019);
USAO, Trial, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/usao/justice-101/trial (last visited
Apr. 19, 2019).
128 See Spurgeon Kennedy, Freedom and Money–Bail in America, PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY,
https://www.psa.gov/?q=node/97 (last visited Apr. 17, 2019).
129 See Gupta et al., supra note 38, at 478, 496.
130 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.8 (AM. LAW INST. 2019).
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released with non-financial conditions.131
1. Washington, D.C.
In Washington, D.C., for nearly thirty years, the pretrial release
process has operated without using secured money bail.132 Nearly all
defendants charged with low-level misdemeanor offenses and
nonviolent felony offenses are released into the community on
nonfinancial conditions (e.g., curfew, stay-away, drug testing) and 8890% of all defendants on pretrial release reappear for all future court
dates.133 This remarkably low FTA rate has been consistent over a
number of years.134 One study found that during the six-year period
from 2007-2012, 88% of all defendants on pretrial release
subsequently returned to court when ordered.135 The D.C. Pretrial
Services Agency sends court notifications to each defendant a few
days before each court date to remind the defendant when and where
they are required to report for court.136
2. New Jersey
The State of New Jersey issued a 2019 report on the impact of the
statewide bail reform legislation that took effect in January 2017.137
One of the factors that led to the new bail law was a 2013 study which
revealed that 40% of the New Jersey jail population consisted of
pretrial defendants who were unable to pay cash bail.138 Of those
pretrial detainees, 12% remained in jail because they could not afford
to pay $2,500 or less.139 The new bail law significantly de-prioritizes
money bail in favor of an assessment of whether the defendant is a
flight risk or safety risk. Non-monetary conditions of release are
imposed by the court for low risk defendants under the supervision
of the state’s pretrial services agency. 140 The report found that more
131 See CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, HARVARD LAW SCH., MOVING BEYOND MONEY:
A PRIMER ON BAIL REFORM 15 (2016) [hereinafter MOVING BEYOND MONEY].
132 See CHRISTINE BLUMAUER ET AL., NAACP, ADVANCING BAIL REFORM IN MARYLAND:
PROGRESS AND POSSIBILITIES 33 (2018).
133 See MOVING BEYOND MONEY, supra note 131, at 15; Kennedy, supra note 128.
134 See MOVING BEYOND MONEY, supra note 131, at 15.
135 See Kennedy, supra note 128.
136 See CLIFFORD T. KEENAN, PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY FOR THE D.C., THE GUIDE TO PSA’S
PROGRAMS AND SERVICES 6 (4th ed. 2016).
137 GLENN A. GRANT, N.J. COURTS, 2018 REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE (Apr.
2019), https://njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/2018cjrannual.pdf?c=dSE.
138 Id. at 6.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 31.
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than 24,000 lower-risk pretrial defendants released under the new
law than would have been eligible for release under the State’s prior
cash bail system.141 In total, in 2017 approximately 139,000 lower
risk pretrial defendants were granted release without money bail and
over 89% returned to court as ordered.142
3. Philadelphia, Pennsylvannia
Another 2019 study found that eliminating secure money bail
resulted in no increase in the failure to appear rate.143 In 2018, the
newly-elected progressive prosecutor in Philadelphia, Larry Krasner,
announced that his office would no longer seek money bail for
defendants charged with a range of misdemeanor and nonviolent
felony cases.144 In announcing the policy Krasner stated: “There is
absolutely no reason why someone who will show up for court, is not
a flight risk, and is no threat to their neighbors and community,
needs to sit in jail for days because they can’t post a small amount of
bail. It’s simply not fair. We don’t imprison the poor for poverty.” 145
The announcement included a list of twenty-four misdemeanor and
nonviolent felony charges that Krasner instructed his prosecutors not
to seek cash bail for at bail hearings, including various property
offenses, food stamp fraud, identity theft, possession of marijuana,
possession of drug paraphernalia, receiving stolen property,
prostitution, and trespass.146 Though only judges have the power to
set bail conditions, as anticipated, the court largely did not impose a
secure money bail condition when not requested by the prosecutor.147
The study examined over 47,000 cases filed during a 20-month period
from 2017-2018 and found a 22% decrease in the number of pretrial
detainees in jail in Philadelphia and “no detectable evidence that the
decreased use of monetary bail, unsecured bond, and release on
conditions had adverse effects on appearance rates or recidivism.”148

Id. at 18.
Id. at 14.
143 See Ouss & Stevenson, supra note 25, at 11–12.
144 See id. at 2; Phila. Dist. Attorney’s Office, Larry Krasner Announces End to Cash Bail in
Philadelphia for Low-Level Offenses, PHILA. DISTRIC ATT’YS OFF. (Feb. 21, 2018), https://phillyd
a.wordpress.com/2018/02/21/larry-krasner-announces-end-to-cash-bail-in-philadelphia-forlow-level-offenses/.
145 Phila. Dist. Attorney’s Office, supra note 144.
146 See id.
147 See Ouss & Stevenson, supra note 25, at 4, 9.
148 Id. at 7, 13; Samantha Melamed, Philly DA Larry Krasner Stopped Seeking Bail for LowLevel Crimes. Here’s What Happened Next., PHILA. INQUIRER (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.phill
y.com/news/philly-district-attorney-larry-krasner-money-bail-criminal-justice-reform141
142
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A similar study examined data from criminal cases in Philadelphia
from 2010-2015 and found that while “the goal of money bail is to
assure appearance at trial . . . [o]ur results suggest that money bail
has a negligible effect or, if anything, increases failures to appear.”149
4. Allegany County (Pittsburg)
According to a 2017 report prepared by the Allegany County
Pretrial Services Agency, from October 2016 through November
2017, of the 3,584 low risk defendants screened by the office, 97%
were released with nonfinancial conditions. The agency sent court
reminders for all hearings using a combination of text messages,
email and voice calls, and only 6% failed to return on the scheduled
court date.150
5. Cook County, Illinois (Chicago)
A 2019 report published by the Circuit Court of Cook County
examined the impact of bail reform measures in the county. 151 In
contrast to most bail reform measures, the Cook County initiative
focused on felony cases.152 The report detailed, among other things,
the Model Bond Court initiative implemented in late 2017 to foster
greater pretrial release among those pending felony charges.153
Under the revised bail procedcures, in lieu of secure money bail,
nearly double the number of felony pretrial defendants were released
on a personal recognizances (“I-Bond”).154 Notably, despite the drastic
increase in non-financial release, there was no corresponding
increase in the failure to appear rate.155 Both before and after the new
reforms ushered in a massive expansion of pretrial release for those
incarceration-20190219.html.
149 Gupta et al., supra note 38, at 478, 496 (emphasis added).
150 See id.; see also ALLEGHENY CTY. PRETRIAL SERVS. DEP’T, FIFTH JUDICIAL DIST. OF PA.,
2015 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2015) (“The court reminder system, for which Pennsylvania
Commission on Crime and Delinquency (PCCD) funding was received in 2013, was completed
in 2015 with reminders for all hearing types added to the system. Messages are sent via email,
text, or landline following internal business rules.”).
151
STATE OF ILL. CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK CTY., BAIL REFORM IN COOK COUNTY: AN
EXAMINATION OF GENERAL ORDER 18.8A AND BAIL IN FELONY CASES (May 2019), http://www.co
okcountycourt.org/Portals/0/Statistics/Bail%20Reform/Bail%20Reform%20Report%20FINAL
%20-%20%20Published%2005.9.19.pdf.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 4.
154
See id. at 4; Id. at 27 (finding that the I-Bond rate of 36.3% rose to 61.8% after
comprehensive bail reform measures were instituted).
155 Id. at 30–31 (reporting that 82.5% reappearance rate before the bail reform initiative,
and 83.2% reappearance rate among those released under the reform bail procedures).
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pending felony charges, the reappearance rate remained steady at
approximately 80%. Also, the overall impact of the reform measures
resulted in a reduction of the jail population from 11,486 people to
5,799—a fifty percent decrease.156
6. New York City
A 2019 report, “Pretrial Release Without Money,” was released by
the New York City Criminal Justice Agency. 157 The report examined
pretrial release practices in New York City over the thirty-year
period from 1987-2018. During this time, courts reduced the use of
money bail and increased the number of people released with
nonfinancial conditions by over 25%.158 The report also found that
over roughly the same time period that the nonfinancial release, “the
rate of reappearance increased in all crime severity categories.”159
Overall, the court reappearance rate rose from 84% to 86%.160 The
report concluded that “New York City has shown it’s possible to
release a greater percentage of defendants with minimal conditions
and improve court attendance at the same time.”161
7. Colorado
A 2013 pretrial release study was conducted in Colorado to
determine, among other things, the failure to appear rate for low-risk
defendants released on secured money bail and failure to appear rate
for low-risk defendants released on unsecured bail.162 The study
examined nearly 2,000 new criminal cases filed during a 16-month
period from 2008-2009.163 The cases were drawn from ten Colorado
counties (covering 80% of the population).164 The study concluded
that low-risk pretrial defendants who were required to pay a secured
money bail were not more likely to return to court than were low-risk
Id. at 36.
AUBREY FOX & STEPHEN KOPPEL, PRETRIAL RELEASE WITHOUT MONEY: NEW YORK CITY,
1987-2018 (Mar. 2019), https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumen
tFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=15ad6f0e-b18c-d8d8-ec60-156090d88968&forceDialog=0.
158 Id. at 2 (stating: that the rate of release without money rose from a low of 50% of pretrial
defendants in 1990 to 76% by 2018.
159 Id. at 9.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 10.
162 See MOVING BEYOND MONEY, supra note 131, at 7; MICHAEL R. JONES, PRETRIAL JUSTICE
INST., UNSECURED BONDS: THE AS EFFECTIVE AND MOST EFFICIENT PRETRIAL RELEASE OPTION
3 (2013).
163 See JONES, supra note 162, at 3, 6.
164 See id. at 6.
156
157
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defendants who were released on an unsecured.165 Thus, secured
money bail did not provide any greater incentive or yield any better
results in flight risk, the only relevant consideration for the court in
setting bail in cases involving petty crimes.166
8. Kentucky
Perhaps an even more startling study on the impact of secured
money bail is a 2013 published report which shows that the increased
length of pretrial detention, especially for low-risk detainees,
increases the likelihood of missed court hearings.167 Using data from
over 150,000 defendants booked into jails in Kentucky in 2009 and
2010, the study found that when compared to defendants released
within a day, bailable low-risk defendants detained for as few as two
to three days were 22% more likely to miss future court hearings.168
This finding directly undermines the singular goal of bail for low level
nonviolent defendants.
Collectively, the empirical evidence and comprehensive studies of
pretrial release and reappearance in diverse jurisdictions across the
country illustrate the fallacy of any perceived link between the
financial incentive of money bail and preventing failure to appear.169
Overwhelmingly, pretrial defendants granted release without
financial conditions can and do return to court when ordered.
Moreover, as discussed below, there are other more effective ways
courts can proactively impact reappearance rates.
B. FTA, Forfeiture, and Bail Jumping
In addition to the fact the overwhelming majority of pretrial
defendants return to court without the financial incentive of money
bail, money bail is also not needed because existing legal
consequences for failure to appear—including arrest, detention, new
criminal charges—are more dire and “incentivizing.”170 While every

See id. at 3.
See id.
167 See CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP ET AL., LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., THE HIDDEN
COSTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 4, 10 (2013).
168 See id.
169 See, e.g., ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1131–32 (S.D. Tex. 2017), aff’d
in part and rev’d and vacated in part, 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018); MOVING BEYOND MONEY,
supra note 131, at 15.
170 See, e.g., Iowa v. Williams, 445 N.W.2d 408, 410 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989); Alan J. Tompkins
et al., An Experiment in the Law: Studying a Technique to Reduce Failure to Appear in Court,
48 CT. REV. 96, 98 (2012).
165
166
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state allows for forfeiture of the money bail for failure to appear in
court,171 in addition, the court will likely issue a bench warrant which
subjects the defendant to immediate arrest if the defendant does not
voluntarily surrender.172 Second, the missed court date provides
grounds for the court and revoke pretrial release and send the
defendant to jail for the duration of the case.173 Most significantly,
nonappearance at a scheduled court date subjects the defendant to a
new criminal charge, commonly, Criminal Failure to Appear (FTA)
or “bail jumping.”174 While generally the new FTA charge is only a
misdemeanor offense if the defendant failed to report to court in a
misdemeanor case, in some jurisdictions, regardless of whether the
original charged offense was a misdemeanor or a felony offense, the
defendant faces a felony FTA charge if there is evidence that the
defendant absconded to evade prosecution or if the defendant does
not return to court to surrender within a specified period of time after
missing the court date.175 Although sentences vary for FTA offenses,
generally these offenses carry a year or more in addition to any
sentence imposed on the original criminal charge, and the defendant
can be convicted of FTA even if acquitted of the original crime.176 In

171 See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 540.10(1) (McKinney 2019) (“If, without sufficient excuse, a
principal does not appear when required or does not render himself amenable to the orders and
processes of the criminal court wherein bail has been posted, the court must enter such facts
upon its minutes and the bail bond or the cash bail, as the case may be, is thereupon forfeited.”);
Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Pretrial Release Violations & Bail Forfeiture (June 28,
2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/bail-forfeiture-procedures.aspx.
172 See 8A AM. JUR. 2D Bail and Recognizance § 175 (2019); Nirej Sekhon, Dangerous
Warrants, 93 WASH. L. REV. 967, 978–79 (2018); e.g., Louisiana v. Perry, 13-566, p. 2 (La. App.
3 Cir. 12/11/13); 127 So. 3d 1064, 1065–66.
173 See Tennessee v. Huskey, 177 S.W.3d 868, 886 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005); Vermont v.
Quist, No. 08-336, 2008 Vt. Unpub. LEXIS 293, at *3–4 (Vt. Sept. 16, 2008); Nat’l Conference
of State Legislatures, supra note 171.
174 E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.8 (AM. LAW INST. 2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-51(b)
(2019) (“Any person who has been charged with or convicted of the commission of a
misdemeanor and has been set at liberty on bail or on his own recognizance upon the condition
that he will subsequently appear at a specified time and place commits the offense of
misdemeanor-bail jumping if, after actual notice to the defendant in open court or notice to the
person by mailing to his last known address or otherwise being notified personally in writing
by a court official or officer of the court, he fails without sufficient excuse to appear at that time
and place. A person convicted of the offense of misdemeanor-bail jumping shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.”); see also Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 171 (stating nearly
every state has a criminal punishment for bail jumping); Karen L. Ellmore, State Statutes
Making Default on Bail a Separate Criminal Offense, 63 A.L.R.4TH 1064 § 1(a) (noting multiple
jurisdictions make “bail jumping” a criminal offense).
175 See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 171; 8A AM. JUR. 2D Bail and
Recognizance § 175 (2019).
176 See Amy Johnson, The Use of Wisconsin’s Bail Jumping Statute: A Legal and
Quantitative Analysis, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 619, 621 (2018); Nat’l Conference of State
Legislatures, supra note 171.
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the long run, conviction for bail jumping will undoubtedly justify a
judge denying pretrial release in any future criminal case and could
indicate to a judge that the defendant is a poor candidate for a
probationary sentence that could have been imposed on the original
low-level misdemeanor charge.177
A 2018 behavioral science study provides support for the fact that
the threat of arrest and criminal sanctions are effective in
incentivizing low-level offenders to return to court when ordered.178
The study focused on reducing the high FTA rate in New York City
courts among low-level offenders that received a citation or summons
to appear in court for traffic and regulatory violations (i.e., littering
and drinking alcohol in public).179 The study found that, while
sending text messages are helpful in reminding offenders to make
their court date, the most significant impact on the FTA rate was the
result of text messages that coupled the court reminder with a
reminder of the negative legal consequences of failure to appear:
“Remember, you have court tomorrow at 9:30AM. Tickets could be
dismissed or end in a fine (60 days to pay). Missing court . . . can lead
to your arrest.”180 The study found that this version of the text
message reduced the FTA rate among low-level offenders by 26%.181
Thus, without using money bail to incentivize low level offenders,
leveraging the existing adverse criminal consequences for
nonappearance can provide a powerful incentive for defendants to
return to court when ordered.
C. Disentangling Attendance Risk from Evading Prosecution
The term “flight risk” conjures up images of a fleeing fugitive “on
the run,” intentionally trying to escape prosecution and punishment
for misdeeds. This dire image bears little resemblance to the actual
reasons that defendants charged with low-level, nonviolent offenses
miss court dates.182 Generally the failure to appear rate among low
level offenders is more attributable to personal life struggles than a
177 See Ethan Corey & Puck Lo, The ‘Failure to Appear’ Fallacy, APPEAL (Jan. 9, 2019),
https://theappeal.org/the-failure-to-appear-fallacy/ (“This single-minded focus on so-called
failure-to-appear (FTA) rates obscures the fact that most people who miss court aren’t on the
run.”).
178 See BRICE COOKE ET AL., USING BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE TO IMPROVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
OUTCOMES: PREVENTING FAILURES TO APPEAR IN COURT 4 (2018).
179 See id.
180 Id. at 13.
181 Id. at 16.
182 See Corey & Lo, supra note 177 (“[T]his single-minded focus on so-called failure-to-appear
(FTA) rates obscures the fact that most people who miss court aren’t on the run.”).
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willful effort to abscond or avoid the legal consequences that flow
from the pending charge. In fact, these low level offenders have the
least incentive to flee or evade prosecution because they have the
least to lose if convicted. The potential criminal sanction for low-level
misdemeanor and traffic offenses is generally a fine or probation.183
Moreover, due to their impecunity, this population of pretrial
defendants lack the financial resources to flee the jurisdiction.
Similarly, as a practical matter, money bail will not incentivize
indigent people to come to court because they do not have (and cannot
acquire) money to post the bail.184 Thus, the financial incentive of
avoiding forfeiture simply does not exist.185
Significantly, many low-level offenders suffer from a range of social
disadvantages, including mental health disorders, drug addiction,
alcoholism, unemployment, homelessness, or some combination of
these challenges.186 Many are, therefore, consumed with daily
struggles over where to get their next meal; where they will sleep at
night; whether they will be injured or abused on the street or in a
shelter; whether they will be able to receive the medicine they need;
and how they can care for their children.187
Against this backdrop of persistent crisis, it can be challenging to
navigate returning to court for future court appearances.188 Because
the next court date is usually weeks or months after the date of initial
release, many low-level offenders simply forget court dates in the
interim.189 Other common reasons for missing court include: “I could
not find my court papers, so I did not know what day I was supposed
to show up”; “I thought court was next week”; “I did not have money
for the bus”; “I did not have child care”; “I had to go to work or lose
my job”; and “I came to court but I could not figure out what courtroom

183 See Paul Bergman, Felonies, Misdemeanors, and Infractions: Classifying Crimes, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/crimes-felonies-misdemeanors-infractionsclassification-33814.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2019).
184 See Jamiles Lartey, TV Made America’s Bail System Famous. Now Reformers Want to
End It, GUARDIAN (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/30/newjersey-bail-reform-criminal-justice-bond-money.
185 See id.
186 See Corey & Lo, supra note 177.
187 See Suzanne M. Spencer-Wood & Christopher N. Matthews, Impoverishment,
Criminalization, and the Culture of Poverty, 45 ARCHAEOLOGIES OF POVERTY 1, 1 (2011).
188 See Meagan Flynn, Harris County Bail System Offers Little Help to Defendants Who Most
Need It, Cases Reveal, HOUSTON CHRON. (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/ne
ws/houston-texas/houston/article/Harris-County-bail-system-shortchanges-defendants12516456.php (finding that the high rate of failures to appear in Houston post-ODonnell results
from a disproportionate number of people suffering from mental illness and homelessness).
189 See COOKE ET AL., supra note 178, at 6, 9.
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to go to.”190
For this population of offenders, in lieu of imposing a money bond
that results in pretrial detention, courts should adopt alternative
conditions of release that focus more directly on the root causes of
failure to appear. To that end, jurisdictions across the country have
adopted the practice of sending court notifications or court date
reminders to those on pretrial release.191 This simple proactive
approach to preventing failure to appear is endorsed by the American
Bar Association192 and mirrors the common approach used by doctors
assure that patients remember to report for scheduled medical
appointments.
The empirical evidence from jurisdictions around the country
demonstrate that these court notifications—sent via text message,
email, automated voice calls, written letters, and even using
volunteers to make telephone calls193—are very effective in getting
defendants to return for court dates.194 A 2005 study in Jefferson
County, Colorado, found that calling the defendant’s home and
leaving a message reduced the FTA rate from 21% to 13%.195 The
study also found that speaking to the defendant directly reduced the
FTA rate to 8%.196 A 2006 study in Multnomah County, Oregon found
that court reminders sent via an automated telephone dialing system
reduced the failure to appear rate by 31%.197
Another 2006 study in Coconino County, Arizona, focused on the
high FTA rate among those who had been issued police citations and
subsequently ordered to appear in court.198 The researchers sent
telephone notifications to one group of 245 people and the FTA rate
was 12.9%.199 The control group of 244 people received no court

190 See Case Studies in Court Reminders, SAFETY & JUSTICE MATTERS (John D. & Catherine
T. MacArthur Found., Chi., Ill.), Sept. 6, 2018.
191 See JENNIFER ELEK ET AL., USE OF COURT DATE REMINDER NOTICES TO IMPROVE COURT
APPEARANCE RATES 1 (2017), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/PJCC/PJCC%20B
rief%2010%20Sept%202017%20Court%20Date%20Notification%20Systems.ashx.
192 See STANDARDS FOR PRETRIAL RELEASE § 10-1.10(k) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
193 See MOVING BEYOND MONEY, supra note 3, at 16; PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., USING
TECHNOLOGY TO ENHANCE PRETRIAL SERVICES: CURRENT APPLICATIONS AND FUTURE
POSSIBILITIES 16 (2012) [hereinafter USING TECHNOLOGY].
194
PETER EDELMAN, NOT A CRIME TO BE POOR: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY IN
AMERICA 57 (2017).
195 See USING TECHNOLOGY, supra note 193, at 14.
196 See id.
197 See id. at 15.
198 See PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., RATIONAL AND TRANSPARENT BAIL DECISION MAKING:
MOVING FROM A CASH-BASED TO A RISK-BASED PROCESS 31 (2012) [hereinafter RATIONAL AND
TRANSPARENT BAIL DECISION MAKING].
199 See id.
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notification and the FTA was 25.4%, nearly double.200 The study
found that the FTA dropped to 5.9 percent when the defendant
received the automated call directly.201 Similarly, in 2009-2010,
researchers in Nebraska conducted a study of nearly 8,000
defendants in fourteen different counties and found that they were
able to reduce the FTA rate by sending court date reminders.202
Most recently, a 2018 court notification study conducted by the
University of Chicago found that the FTA rates in New York City
dropped 32% one month after implementing a notification system.203
Other studies have achieved similar results.204 Moreover, in the last
two years several additional jurisdictions have initiated court
notification programs as part of larger bail reform efforts.205
As discussed in Part II, infra, the clear constitutional imperative
for imposing cash bail on indigents is an ability to pay determination
and consideration of reasonable alternatives for accomplishing the
state’s purpose in preventing failure to appear. While no research
studies show that use of money bail is the only means of achieving
the state’s compelling interest in reappearance, there is now a wealth
of research and empirical data which concludes that release on
nonfinancial conditions and the use of court reminders is an effective
approach to ensuring reappearance without the deprivation of
pretrial defendants occasioned by the use of money bail.206
IV. CONCLUSION
The bail reform litigation that is currently underway across the
country has fundamentally changed bail practices in several
jurisdictions and has prompted reform in many others. The reform
has involved significant changes to the bail determination process
See id.
See id.
202 See Mitchell N. Herian & Brian H. Bornstein, Reducing Failure to Appear in Nebraska:
A Field Study, in 9 PUBLICATIONS OF AFFILIATED FAC. 11, 11–12, 13 (2010).
203 See COOKE ET AL., supra note 178, at 4.
204 See e.g., Brian H. Bornstein et al., Reducing Courts’ Failure-to-Appear Rate by Written
Reminders, 19 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 70, 71 (2013).
205 See Case Studies in Court Reminders, supra note 190.
In 2018, Charleston, South
Carolina launched their court reminder initiative; Pima County, Arizona expanded their voice
notification system to include text messages; and other jurisdictions that are in the process of
implementing court reminder systems include New Orleans, Louisiana; Cook County, Illinois;
New York, New York; Spokane, Washington; Ada County, Idaho; and Lucas County, Ohio. See
id.
206 See, e.g., COOKE ET AL., supra note 178, at 4; RATIONAL AND TRANSPARENT BAIL DECISION
MAKING, supra note 198, at 31; USING TECHNOLOGY, supra note 193, at 14; Bornstein et al.,
supra note 204, at 71; Herian and Bornstein, supra note 202, at 11–12, 13.
200
201
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and changes in the manner and extent to which courts use secure
money bail, especially in cases of low-level, nonviolent misdemeanor
and traffic offenses.207 The changes in bail practices have resulted in
dramatic reductions in the pretrial jail population.208 As other state
courts grapple with whether to continue imposing money bail,
especially for low-risk defendants, the bail reform that has been
successfully implemented in jurisdictions around the country
preclude the blanket assumption that money bail is necessary for all
defendants to assure reappearance. If nearly 90% of defendants
granted pretrial release without money bail return to court when
ordered there should be no need for courts to impose money bail and
risk subjecting indigent pretrial defendants to unwarranted pretrial
detention. Likewise, the continued use of money bail cannot be
justified as the only means of achieving the courts compelling interest
in preventing failures to appear. There is now empirical evidence
that other approaches are at least as effective and exact a far less toll
on the life and liberty of those who are presumed innocent.

207
208

See supra, Section III.A.
See id.

